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REPLY
REGULATORY SINS VERSUS MARKET
LEGACIES: A SHORT REPLY TO
MR. LEECH
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I think everything that Michael Leech has said, without
exception, is dead wrong. Now, let me explain why. His first point
is to indict American society as it operates today for its divisiveness, its decline in education and its overall stress and strain.'
Fair enough. However, nothing I have advocated has been the law
of this country since 1965. Every one of the social ills that Mr.
Leech referred to, from illegitimacy, to lack of education, to crime,
to racial segregation, is higher and more pitched today than it
was in 1965.2 To say that the current situation should be attributed to policies which are not in effect is to ask the obvious
question - why are these unanticipated, unexpected and unwanted consequences laid at the doorstep of those who oppose the dominant legal policies after they were implemented? It is simply odd
to claim that those policies which were never adopted should be
invoked to explain the deplorable conditions that society experiences today. We should not lay the sins of modern regulation on
the doorsteps of markets.
If you compare the shifts that took place between 1946 and
1965, you will see that the overall level of wage improvement in
the earlier period was far higher than it is today, and that the

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The short rejoinder that follows was a response to Michael Leech's oral presentation that only touched on some of the topics that he raised in his paper. I have
not attempted to address the other issues that he raises in his paper, but silence
should not be treated as a sign of agreement.
It is, for example, odd if not absurd to measure American attitudes toward
race by the contemptible statements of two murder defendants who try to unsuccessfully whip up racial sentiment to help them in their case. See Michael J. Leech,
Legalizing Employment Discrimination:A Foolish and Dangerous Policy, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 587, 594-95 (1996). The issue of employment (or affirmative
action) depends not on the desperate ploys of isolated citizens, but on the conscious
policies of major institutions and their leaders. Mr. Leech would have a point if he
could find examples of similar speech or behavior from the heads of the FORTUNE
500 companies.
1. See Michael J. Leech, Legalizing Employment Discrimination:A Foolish and
Dangerous Policy, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 587, 590-94 (1996).
2. See id. at 590-96.
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level of unemployment before the minimum wage increases and
the Civil Rights Act was far lower in the black population than it
is today.3 Additionally, the educational achievements of blacks
were in many cases were higher than they are today, notwithstanding affirmative action. These observations are clear if you
only extrapolate modestly from the 1946 to 1964 period and compare that figure to the wage stagnation during the 1973 to 1995
period. Then you might conclude that something has gone very
wrong. The social situation which Mr. Leech deplores is an indictment of the law that brought it about, not of the proposals which
urge "look, this is not the way that things ought to have been."
The second point of Mr. Leech's that I wish to dispute is his
astonishing claim that laissez-faire brought on Jim Crow.4 This is
not what laissez-faire is about. Laissez faire is the utter antithesis
of any system of state regulation that tries to limit freedom of
association. 5 In effect, all Jim Crow statutes represented the view
that the government knew best as to who should be able to associate, and with whom. The Jim Crow era was the embodiment of a
large government syndrome that was allowed to flourish with the
acquiescence of a compliant and flaccid Supreme Court. The first
John Marshall Harlan was the only Supreme Court Justice who
was prepared to strike down the various statutes in Plessy v.
Ferguson.' He was also the Justice who was prepared to, and did
strike down, the collective bargaining laws in the labor statutes in
1908 in Adair v. United States.7 He understood perfectly well that
when you are talking about open markets you are speaking of the
antithesis of a state-run system. If you look closely at the situation, you will often discover that the enemy of the open market
was not businesses, but often workers, who by their unions directed all the good jobs to their members and away from individuals
in minority groups. They sometimes functioned then, as they
sometimes function now, as the most retrograde, elemental force
in any civil society.
Third, Mr. Leech's proposals on how to restructure the
workforce may be a boon to lawyers but they invite economic ruin-

3. For a detailed discussion of recorded data regarding the effects of the
Antidiscrimination Laws, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 242-66 (1992) [hereinafter
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS).

4. See Leech, supra note 1, at 596-97, 612-13.
5. See Richard A. Epstein & Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 349, 354 (1993)
[hereinafter Title VII Repeal].
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
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ation.8 As I understand him, his proposal does not focus on the
question of the discrimination as such, but on whether any
employer's decisions make good business sense. That proposal
means that every time someone challenges an employment decision in court, some judge, jury, panel or board will impanel a
committee to review it. The committee will be staffed by individuals who do not know the business and who do not have any incentive to make the right decision. They are wholly detached from
the firm, inexperienced in what it does, and yet, society asks them
to decide years later about whether some earlier decision was
rational. It cannot be done. It should not be tried. We do not need
government socialism on the judicial installment plan.
A deeper fallacy pervades Mr. Leech's remarks. He assumes
that whenever markets are not perfect, intervention is appropriate. 9 However, the question is never whether markets are perfect.
I never said that they were; no one in his or her right mind could
believe that. You have to ask questions, such as: do governments
work better than markets? are employers going to get a higher
level of error when the decisions are made by people who have to
bear the financial consequences of error, or are they going to get a
higher level of error by individuals who escape the consequences
of their mistakes?
Mr. Leech has fallen prey to one other common error. If you
are trying to figure out whether you get discrimination in unregulated markets, you cannot look at the behavior of employers in
regulated markets. The reported incidents of discrimination, assuming that they are accurate, give a poor guide to market behavior without civil rights laws. Right now, if employers have identical white and black workers coming to them, they would not have
identical future employees: one of the workers they probably could
dismiss without complications and the other worker could sue
them on the same event.
The upshot is that the law creates a complicated set of incentives that have different impacts at different stages of the relationship. Once employers hire workers, black workers may get
better treatment than whites, especially if the threat of litigation
seems real. But in terms of the initial hiring decision, the white
workers may well get better treatment than blacks. Those two
results help explain why everyone has reason to regard himself or
herself as a victim. Those people who focus on the hiring process
can see the words "affirmative action employer" written in every
journal and in every magazine in the United States at the bottom
of the ads. Those people who start to focus on the covert refusal to

8. See id. at 598-99.
9. Leech, supra note 1, at 597-99.
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hire black workers see discrimination running in the opposite
direction.
I submit that a legal regime which has helped make race as
raw an issue as it is today is one that is wrong. This is not a
question of who believes in "human dignity." We all do. This is a
question of whether society thinks it can get dignity from a set of
rules which, in their enforcement, ignore every aspect of dignity.
They force employers to bear the indignities of false charges. They
force employers to humiliate, in public, workers for incompetence
and worse when in a previous time they could simply let the
workers go. They force society to labor under the indignities of a
command and control system of economy.
Jim Crow laws came from politics. They did not come from
markets. They come from the same situation where by majority
vote fifty-one people can wipe out the fortunes of the other fortynine. You might say that this is an exaggeration because we have
checks and balances in political institutions that prevent simple
majorities from prevailing. But that point would not be responsive
here. One obvious point is that checks and balances will not help
individuals and groups that are systematically cut out from the
political process, which is of course what Jim Crow did. Nor will
they help when people are only admitted into politics unless they
can organize in sufficient numbers to stop the steamroller that
would run over them. A minority of forty-five percent may well be
able to hold out against a majority, but the smaller discrete and
insular minorities do not have sufficient power to hold back the
tides of oppression that can be heaped on them. If it were possible
to keep to the model of a limited but strong government dedicated
to protecting property and contract, then an individual could be
secure in his individual rights no matter how much the numbers
are stacked against him. Additionally, the prospect of new entrants drawn to the region by greater economic prosperity could
alter the political climate for the better. These dynamics should
remind us all that Jim Crow is not possible to replicate. We cannot replicate Jim Crow even with full judicial enforcement of
private contracts. This is the same point that I made earlier about
the collective decision of the jury. Jim Crow laws all come through
legislation.10

Voluntary markets do not propagate Jim Crow statutes. Markets work because a minority is allowed to have its way. Legislation allows the majority to snuff out the associational preferences

10. Jim Crow laws came into effect not through limited government, but by
massive state regulation left unchecked by passive judicial action. FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS, supra note 3, at 94. See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice:The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part I: the Heyday
of Jim Crow Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982).
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of the minority. It prevents those firms from entering the South
who would do business with black workers by forcing them to toe
a line set by others. A market regime does not countenance segregation, bloodshed, murder and lying, but prohibits them categorically. What a market simply says is that people can choose the
individuals with whom they associate, and other individuals black or white - can make that same choice." A market cannot
stop a political order from bringing public force to bear on them.
It cannot stop a lynching. It is for that reason that venomous and
hateful people are much more dangerous in a political situation
than a market one. Society needs a strong constitutional system
that protects life, liberty and property from exaggerated regulation under the police power to stop such people. Government
lacked this when the courts held the Jim Crow legislation of the
1890s constitutional.
The dispute between Mr. Leech and myself is not whether we
think bad motives are bad. We agree that they are. The dispute
here is whether we think bad motives are more dangerous when
you have political power behind them than when they do not.
People can migrate away from terrible racists to better employers,
but they cannot migrate away from a lynch mob, and they cannot
migrate away from a statute. If it turns out that a working majority of the people are racist, society will still get that Jim Crow
statute. With the same situation in an open market protected by
constitutional safeguards, society will have a thriving economy
because of the power of politically dominant groups to squelch
their rivals.' 2 The question people have to ask is whether
society's collective determinations will allow minority sentiments
of good will to survive. The answer to that question is that they
will not in a strong majoritarian world. The upshot is that you do
not have a sufficient condition for a Jim Crow law by showing
racial animus. To get Jim Crow, society must have a political
mechanism that allows people to aggregate preferences in a destructive fashion. '3 The bigots in the South did not implement
their programs through a market because markets protect minorities. In fact, if you look in the South before 1890, black educational levels, nutritional levels and all the rest were moving smartly
upward until 1890 when the increases stopped.
Now, what is going to happen today? The simple point today
is: the wage figures and levels in the United States have not significantly moved since 1975. If you measure wages by race and

11. Comparative markets do a much better job in arranging people by tastes,
abilities and preferences than a political system based on heavy government regulation. Title VII Repeal, supra note 5, at 356.
12. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 3, at 95.
13. Id. at 95-97.
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sex, you see that white male wages have gone down about seven
14
or eight percent, and female wages have gone up two percent.
If you look at the 1946 to 1965 period, you will see aggregate
wages moving up around two and a half to three percent a year.
To defend civil rights laws, government must explain why these
trends just stopped when the modern legal regime came into
place. My answer is that these kinds of restrictions on productivity make it harder to earn a good return on human capital. Under
the current legal regime, therefore, we should expect to see some
businesses moving out of urban areas to suburban ones. So long
as these employers do not have the ability to hire and fire at will,
the best way they can protect themselves in employment markets
is to switch locales.' 5 Society would have more inner city businesses today if it allowed firms to hire people as they chose, knowing that if it did not work out in a particular case, they could fire
without having to justify that decision to a court or board. So once
again we have the same problem that I mentioned before. Civil
rights statutes only protect people after they get jobs. They are
useless to get people jobs. Society cannot enhance the ex-post
protections without increasing the ex-ante costs.
There are no free lunches, even here. Every time an individual brings a civil rights suit, remember that there is some nameless
black person or nameless woman out there whose chances of getting employment have been reduced by your action. The law of
unanticipated social consequences holds for even society's most
cherished social programs.

14. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparityand Employment DiscriminationLaws: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV.
276, 297-98 (1988). See also Sylvia Nasar, Statistics Reveal Bulk of New Jobs Over
Average, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at Al (observing that hourly pay of those at
the bottom half of the workplace continues to decline).
15. Heckman & Verkerke, supra note 14, at 297-98.
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